In this paper, we propose an efficient multicast source authentication protocol based on a novel layered hashchaining scheme.
Introduction
To assure non-repudiation of a multicast stream origin, the stream should be signed. Current digital signature mechanisms are very computationally expensive. Therefore, it is not practical to sign each packet of the multicast stream. Proposed solutions rely on the concept of amortizing a single digital signature over multiple packets. The signature and its amortization induce some extra-information called the authentication information. Besides, most of multicast media streaming applications do not use reliable transport layer. Hence, some packets may be lost in course of transmission. Therefore, the proposed solutions, such as EMSS [1] , introduce redundancy in the authentication information, in a way that even if some packets are lost, the required authentication information can be recovered in order to verify received packets' authenticity. In this case, the bandwidth overhead, induced by the redundant authentication information, increases. Proposed solutions deal with how to trade bandwidth for tolerance to packet loss.
One problem with existing solutions is that they do not take into consideration the distribution of packet loss throughout a large scale network. Indeed, in existing solutions, the source considers the worst packet loss ratio that receivers may encounter in the network and introduces the required authentication information redundancy to tolerate this worst case. This approach assures a high tolerance to packet loss but introduces extra authentication information overhead since it considers the worst case which is likely to appear only at some parts of the network.
In this paper, we propose a multicast source authentication protocol based on a novel layered hash-chaining scheme. We called this protocol: Receiver driven Layered Hash-chaining for multicast source authentication (RLH). This protocol tolerates packet loss and guarantees nonrepudiation of media-streaming origin. RLH allows to save bandwidth as we will see in the simulation results section.
RLH Protocol
In RLH, we use a redundant hash-chaining scheme to amortize a single digital signature over multiple packets. The redundant hash-chaining that we propose is organized into different layers of redundancy. The first layer is the basic data payload layer. It carries data packets chained with a small redundancy degree. These packets are also chained to other facultative layers. Packets of these layers are hashchained using different redundancy degrees (see figure 1) . The data source constructs the different authentication lay- In order to assure continuous non-repudiation of the stream, the source sends periodically a signature packet. Receivers of the stream join the group g 0 and start to verify the authenticity of received packets relying on the basic hash-chains of layer 0. Continuously, receivers report lost packets using time-outs and sequence numbers of received packets. Periodically, each receiver uses the packet loss ratio, calculated during the previous period of time, to decide whether to join another layer in addition to the basic layer in order to improve the verification probability. Indeed, each new layer brings new hash-chains in addition to hash-chains of layer 0, and hence increases the probability that a hash-chain remains between each data packet and a signature packet even if some packets are lost.
Simulations and performance evaluation
We carried out simulations using NS-2 to evaluate the performance of RLH and compare it with EMSS [1] 1 . The decision to join or leave extra-authentication layers is made using a specific function. Table 1 shows which layers should be joined depending on packet loss ratio.
Packet loss ratio
Authentication layers 0% to 15% L0 15% to 35% L0+L1 35% to 45% L0+L2 Area 2: packet loss ratio = 25%
Figure 2. Simulation scenario
We were interested in measuring the tree authentication cost.
2 Figure 3 illustrates the tree authentication cost in-1 Simulation settings: we consider a bursty packet loss pattern with bursts having an average length equal to 7. Then, we considered a stream of 5, 000 packets with a signature packet every 500 packets, and where a packet is hash-linked to packets within the scope of 250 packets. Receivers analyse packet loss ratio and eventually update their membership to authentication layers every 30 seconds. We considered a network with three different areas as shown in figure 2. We used the NS2 implementation of PIM-SM protocol, with RP as a Rendez-vous Point node.
2 It means the number of hashes, sent over a multicast tree, by the size of the multicast tree. We mean by the size of a multicast tree the number of network links that constitute the multicast tree. L0 spans all the receivers in the three areas with a 2 hash redundancy degree. L1 spans only receivers of area 2 with a 4 hash redundancy degree, and finally L2 spans only receivers of area 3 with a 6 hash redundancy degree. In contrast, with EMSS there is a single tree that spans all the receivers in the three areas with a 5 hash redundancy degree. According to the results depicted in figure 3 , we notice that the overall RLH tree authentication cost is roughly 50, 000 hashes less than the cost induced by EMSS. If we consider a 160 bit hash code (such as SHA-1), RLH would then save up to 1 MBytes of tree authentication information.
Future work
Some points will be addressed in the future: from the security point of view, RLH guarantees source authentication and non-repudiation by relying on the existence of hashchains between data packets and signature packets. This technique is vulnerable to a denial of service attack by signature flooding which should be addressed. RLH efficiency increases when the multicast tree size is important and the packet loss phenomenon is concentrated in dense areas. We are planning in the future to study the behavior of RLH in a general case by simulating it over random networks rather than over a particular topology.
